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Abst rac t 
Public employment offices can use different rnethods of mediation to 
get notified vacancies filled. This paper presents an empirical analysis 
of the relationship between mediation method and vacancy duration. 
From a theoretical point of view a vacancy duration consists of two 
periods: an application period and a selection period. Using vacancy 
data from public employment offices we are able to make an empirical 
distinction between the two periods. The estimation results suggest 
that if the public employment office sereens possibly suitable job seek-
ers with respect to for example ability, working experience, education 
and motivation the selection period is shorter. Furthermore it appears 
that in local labour markets with a high unemployment-vacancy ratio 
application periods are substantially shorter. 
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1 Introduction 
Employers can search for new employees in different ways. They can use 
personnel advertisements, use informal search channels or notify the public 
employment office. The choice of a recruitment channel depends on a com-
parison of expected benefits and costs. An advertisement usually attracts 
many applicants which may not all be suitable for the job. An advertisement 
is not only expensive in direct advertising costs but also in screening costs. 
Informal recruitment channels are said to be highly effective in terms of the 
match between worker and job, because both employer and new employee 
gather important information on each other. Friends and colleagues provide 
valuable information to the worker on the working conditions in the firm and 
to the firm on the attitude of the applicant. The use of public employment 
offices as a search channel is very cheap, but the quality of the applicants 
arriving through mediation of the public employment offices is low. 
The Dutch public employment offices provide employers with applicants 
without any direct costs. Yet, this recruitment channel is not very popular. 
From a vacancy survey of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) held 
in March 1990 it appeared that some 30% of all existing vacancies was no-
tified at the public employment office. From a survey of the Dutch ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment it appeared that about 10% of the flow of 
filled job vacancies originated from the public employment offices. There are 
several reasons for this low market share. Almost all workers which register 
at the public employment office as job seekers are unemployed. They are 
obliged to register at the public employment office if they want to receive 
unemployment benefits. Unemployed may not all be equally motivated in 
accepting a job, if one is offered. Employers frequently complain about the 
service of the public employment offices: the applicants are often not very 
suitable for the job in either ability or motivation. Employers seeking for 
new employees therefore often only use the public employment office as an 
additional recruitment channel. 
This article is about the relationship between the duration of notified 
vacancies and the way those vacancies are handled at public employment 
offices in the Netherlands. In our theoretical model we split up the vacancy 
duration in two periods: an application period and a selection period. Dur-
ing the application period employers attract applicants to form a pool of 
potential new employees. During the selection period the best worker is 
picked from the pool of applicants. 
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In the empirical analysis we usevacancy information from 5 regional 
Dutch public employment offices. The database contains information about 
vacancies notified in the first quarter of 1988. The offices have registered 
the completed duration of the job vacancy. Furthermore they have regis-
tered whether or not they themselves were responsible for the filling of the 
vacancies and they have registered which mediation methods they used. 
In 1988 the ratio of unemployed to vacancies was very high. Therefore, 
the flows of applicants towards vacancies were large, and application periods 
short. In theory, the mediation method used by the public employment office 
may influence both the application period and the selection period. The 
application period may be shortened because applicants find their potential 
new employer more rapidly. The selection period may be shortened because 
the public employment office has some pre-selection before sending the job 
seekers to their potential new employer. In the Dutch labour market of 1988 
the main effect of the mediation methods was on the selection period. 
The article is set up as follows. In section 2 we describe the process of 
employers search and we describe the various methods public employment 
offices use to handle notified job vacancies. In section 3 we present our 
empirical model. In section 4 we present the data we use in the analysis 
and we discuss the potential determinants of both application and selection 
periods. Section 5 contains the estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Searching for new employees 
2.1 E m p l o y e r s s ea rch 
Employers usually search for new employees by creating job vacancies. The 
fLrst step of the recruiting process consists of collecting applications from 
interested candidates who possess the genera! skills and attributes required 
for the job. To obtain an initial pool of applicants the employer will actively 
solicit applications. For that he can use formal recruitment channels like 
the public employment office or an advertisement in a newspaper, but he 
may also use an informal recruitment channel like employee referral. Then, 
through a selection process the employer narrows this general applicant pool 
to the person with the best job-specific skills. Finally the applicant accepts 
the job offer (or not). Employers' search is the demand side equivalent 
of job search. Whereas job search has been investigated frequently, both 
theoretically and empirically (Devine and Kiefer [3]), employers search has 
not been analysed frequently. 
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Van Ours and Ridder [7] conclude that employers search non-sequential: 
almost all vacancies are filled from a pool of applicants that is formed shortly 
after the posting of the vacancy, so vacancy durations should be interpreted 
as selection periods and not as search periods for applicants. The hazard 
rate of vacancies being filled is low in the first few weeks and increases after-
wards to remain quite stable. Van Ours and Ridder [8] explicitly decompose 
a vacancy duration into an application period and a selection period and 
analyze the determinants of both periods. In their theoretical model Van 
Ours and Ridder assume that employers choose the length of the application 
period which maximizes the expected discounted profit flow from employing 
a new worker. They find that the size of the flow of applicants has a negative 
influence on the length of the application period. In their empirical analysis 
they find that the application period is rather short: most of the applicants 
arrive in the first few weeks. This confirms their earlier conclusion that va-
cancy durations are mainly selection periods. Abbring en Van Ours [1] study 
employers' search by analyzing the duration of vacancies notified at public 
employment offices. Again, it appears the employers use a nonsequential 
search strategy to find new employees. The application period is short and 
is inversely related to the local unemployment-vacancy ratio. 
2.2 Public employment offices 
The use of public employment offices is costless but there are frequent com-
plaints about sluggishness and poor screening. The public employment of-
fice is not very popular with employers. Employers are especially dissatisfied 
with the quality of the applicants sent by the public employment office and 
dissatisfied with the slowness in which this happens. With relation to the 
quality the employers are dissatisfied with both the gap between abilities 
and vacancy requirements as well as with the motivation of the applicants. 
Barron and Mellow [2] argue that few employers use the free service of the 
public employment office because applicants sent by the public employment 
office have a lower likelihood than other applicants of accepting employment. 
Therefore using public employment office services has higher screening costs 
per vacancy. 
Public employment offices use different methods of mediation to get the 
notified vacancies filled. The Dutch public employment offices use a classifi-
cation of three groups: selfselection, administrative matching and selective 
matching. 
In the case of selfselection the public employment office is rather passive 
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in its mediation. With selfselection information on both job seekers and 
vacancies is recorded in files, to which both employers and job seekers have 
access. Unemployed workers registered at the public employment office are 
not obliged to apply for the vacancies. Job seekers can gather information 
by telephone on a few vacancies recorded on tape. If they are interested 
they can inform the public employment office and in some cases they will 
be invited to the office for an initial screening. If a job seeker is expected to 
be suitable for the job he or she gets the name and address of the employer. 
The (unemployed) job seeker is not obliged to apply. 
Administrative matching means that the vacancy information is matched 
with information about registered job seekers. If there are possibly suitable 
job seekers registered, these job seekers are notified about the job vacancy. 
There is therefore some obligation for the job seeker to apply for the vacancy. 
The employer may get the names of the possibly suitable job seekers and 
may contact these himself. 
Selective matching means that additional to administrative matching 
the public employment office sereens the possibly suitable job seekers with 
respect to ability, working experience, education, motivation, etcetera. 
The costs of the mediation methods differ substantially. Selfselection 
requires the least time for the public employment office. The office provides 
information on vacancies to the job seekers and spends no or just some time 
on the selection of candidates. We consider selfselection to be an extensive 
mediation method. Administrative matching takes more time. The employ-
ment office has to find suitable job seekers matching the vacancy. Selective 
matching takes most time. Apart from the matching the employment of-
fice has to spend time in screening suitable candidates. We consider both 
administrative matching and selective matching to be intensive mediation 
methods. 
Van Ours [6] analyses the influence of mediation methods on durations 
of notified vacancies. From this analysis it appears that intensive matching 
leads to a significant reduction of the duration of vacancies filled by the pub-
lic employment office. Administrative mediation has a positive, though not 
significant effect. Van Ours concludes that it may be necessary to stimulate 
(unemployed) job seekers to apply. Furthermore, it is effective if the public 
employment office does some initial screening of candidates on for example 
motivation. An initial screening on motivation and other aspects seems to 
be very useful. 
In this paper we combine the studies by Abbring and Van Ours [1] and 
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Van Oiirs [6] by introducing in a competing risk model application and 
selection periods, both of which may be innuenced by mediation methods. 
3 Empirical model 
As in Van Ours [6] we assume that the process of füling job vacancies can be 
described by a competing risk model, in which vacancies can either be filled 
by the public employment office or by another channel. We assume these 
to be the competing risks. In order to get probability distributions of the 
latent durations we will make the following assumptions. * Applicants only 
arrive during the application period. After that, the pool of applicants stays 
the same and the selection process is started. The length of the application 
period at the public employment office (other channels) is, conditional on 
a heterogeneity component, exponentially distributed with parameter Ae 
(A0). The same holds for the length of the selection period, with parameter 
0e (60). We will specify these parameters exponentially: Ae = e&x + M e , 
Qe = eTéx+t-e; \0 = e/3°x+tio and 60 = e7°x+"° . X is a vector of explanatory 
variables. /3e, j e , (30 en j 0 are vectors of parameters. /ie, ve, fi0 en v0 are 
unmeasured heterogeneity terms that are simultaneously distributed with 
probability density h (fie, ve,fi0, u0). For the sake of simplicity we will assume 
independence of the latent durations. Furthermore we will assume that the 
lengths of the application and selection periods are independent.2 In that 
case we can rewrite h as the product of four margin al distributions, that is 
/i(/ie,^e,^o,^o) = ge{He)he(ve)g0{no)h0(vo)- In this paper we will further 
restrict ourselves to two point heterogeneity, such that 
ge(x) = l/(l + e^) ifx = ,i\ 
= e^/(l + e^) ifx = iil 
= 0 otherwise, and 
he(x) = l/(l + e^ ) ifx^vl 
= e&/ ( l + e^e) tƒ ar = i/2 
= 0 otherwise, 
1See Van Ours and Ridder [8]. 
2The first assumption enables us to estimate the coeflicients for the public employ-
ment office and the other channels separatily (see section 5). Besides, restrictions on the 
functional form of h are required to accomplish identification. 
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for some fj,\, fi^, v\, v^, ij;e and (e. g0 and h0 are specified like ge and he 
with parameters fi\, /z^, i/*, i/^, V'o and (,0. Note that the expectation of the 
heterogeneity term does not necessarily equal zero, which rnakes a constant 
term in X redundant. 
For the time being we will omit channel subscripts, and denote the length 
of the application period by A and the length of the selection period by S. 
We will now find expressions for the mixing probability density function, ƒ, 
the mixing cumulative distribution function, F, and the mixing hazard rate, 
Ö7 = ƒ / f 1 — Fj for the total (latent) duration T = A + S. In order to do so 
we will first derive the distribution functions conditional on the realisation 
of the unobserved heterogeneity, that is, conditional on A en 9. 
It holds that f^\xjg (a) = Ae-Aa if a > 0 and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, 
fx\A,x,e (*la) = öe - e ( ' - a ) when t > a and 0 otherwise. This implies for the 
simultaneous distribution of A and T 
fA,T\\fi(a,t) = h\A,x,e(t\a) fA\x,e(a) = Me-ete-(x-e)a, (1) 
if t > a and G otherwise. 
When A ^ 0, the marginal distribution of T\X,0 is given by 
fr\x,e(t) = / fA,T\\,e(a,t)da 
^ _ e -
e t e - ( A - ö ) a 
e-x 
xe (e"At - e"w) , (2) 
0 - A 
if t > 0 and 0 otherwise, thus implying for the cumulative distribution 
FT\x,e(t) = f fT\\,e(u)du 
J U 
X9
 fI e -e«_l-Au 
e-x[9 x 
if t > 0 and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the conditional hazard rate ax\x,e CO i's 
given by 
a , m -
 fT
^
e{t)
 -\ee~Xt-e~et (4) 
T | V ( }
 " l-FT]x,e(t) - A V * - A e - " ' ( 4 ) 
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if t > O and O otherwise. 
When A = 0, however, T\X,9 is gamma (A,2) = gamma (9,2) distributed 
and 
fT\x,e(t) = 92e-ett, (5) 
if t > 0 and 0 otherwise. Therefore 
FT\\o (*) = f h («) d« = 1 - (1 + öi )e" e t , (6) 
Jo 
if ï > 0 and 0 otherwise and 
(7) 
if t > 0 and 0 otherwise.3 
The mixture distributions follow by taking the expectation with re-
spect to the unmeasured heterogeneity of ƒ en F. As we have chosen sim-
ple two point heterogeneity this gives ns simple expressions like ƒ (/) = 
'T,w fr,\,e (*) = EM,V h\\,e (*) 9 (/-O ^  (^)- 4 We will not elaborate on this. 
4 Data and variables 
4.1 Data 
Our data are from an experimental registration system of vacancies called 
ARVA (Automatic Registration of Vacancies), in which a few employment 
offices participated. We use a sample from 5 public employment offices of 
501 vacancies that were notifted in the first quarter of 1988 and refer to 
single— one person wanted— vacancies. For each vacancy we know the 
duration as measured by the time between the date of notification of the 
vacancy and the date it was filled. Furthermore we know what mediation 
method was applied, whether it was filled by the public employment office 
or otherwise, etcetera (appendix A and B provide more information on the 
data). 
As described in section 2 vacancies notified at the public employment 
office may be filled by the office itself or by another recruitment channel like 
3The gamma distribution also emerges as alimiting case (A — 9) —* 0 of expressions (2)-
(4). 
4See for example Lancaster [4], section 3.1. 
an advertisement. The latter possibility occurs if the employer uses more 
recruitment channels than just the public employment office. The vacancy 
may end because it is filled, either by an applicant send by the public em-
ployment office or by an applicant who contacted the employer by another 
recruitment channel. After the vacancy is filled, the employment office es-
tablishes whether or not this was due to the mediation of that employment 
office. 
4.2 Variables 
Like in Van Ours [6], we have grouped the possible determinants of appli-
cation and selection period as follows: 
• Labour market conditions: The ratio of unemployment (U) to 
vacancies (V) is specified by occupation and region of the public em-
ployment office. 
• Required skills: We distinguish three categories of vacancies with 
respect to required skills: vacancies for metal or construction workers, 
vacancies for service occupations at a secondary or higher educational 
level, and other vacancies. 
• Characteristics of the employer: Large firms are expected to have 
lower interview costs due to specialization in the hiring process and 
will therefore be more likely users of the public employment office ser-
vices (Barron and Mellow [2]). We distinguish four size classes: 0-10, 
10-50, 50-100, >100 employees. We use a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the use of other recruitment channels is indicated, and 0 other-
wise. We assume that if there is an effect on vacancy duration of the 
reported use of other recruitment channels, this is a signal of employ-
ers' dissatisfaction about the public employment office. Such an effect 
is an indication of employers not using the employment office inten-
sively, because of the expected low effectiveness. 
• Character is t ics of the vacant job: Characteristics like temporary 
or parttime job may be less attractive to job seekers and may thus 
lead to longer vacancy durations. 
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• Local conditïons: Apart from local labour market conditions the 
functioning of the public employment offices themselves may be im-
portant. To investigate the latter we again use dummy variables. We 
only expect an effect of these variables on the latent duration at the 
piiblic employment office. If, however, the employment offices are in 
different regions, and not all regional effects are summarized by the 
local labour market situation, there may be some effect on both latent 
durations. 
• Media t ion method : To investigate whether or not intensive media-
tion is worthwhile we use dummy variables for administrative matching 
and for selective matching. If intensive mediation is effective, it will 
at least reduce selection durations, because it increases the quality of 
the pool of applicants. There may also be an effect on application 
durations: a negative effect because applicants are better informed 
and thus react more rapidly, and a positive effect because more in-
tensive' mediation may demand more administrative capacity from the 
employment office. Any effect of the dummy variables on the vacancy 
duration, however, can also be explained by sample selectivity. If the 
employment office selects vacancies that are not hard to fill for inten-
sive mediation, a positive effect on both latent hazard rates will be 
found. Thus, such a correlation is not very informative on the effec-
tiveness of mediation methods. A positive correlation between the in-
tensity of mediation and employment office hazard rates only, however, 
can only be explained by effective mediation, unless the employment 
offices select vacancies that they can fill relatively easily compared 
to other channels because of other reasons than the already included 
employers' dissatisfaction, etcetera. 
As in Abbring and Van Ours [1] the sets of explanatory variables are different 
for the application and the selection period. For the hazard rate of the 
application period we use the UV-ratio, employers' dissatisfaction, dummy 
variables for the employment offices, and the use of mediation methods as 
explanatory variables. The hazard rate of the selection period is determined 
by required skills, size of the firm, employers' dissatisfaction, characteristics 
of the vacant job, and the use of mediation methods. The UV-ratio can 
be included to provide a test on the nonsequential search assumption (see 
Abbring en Van Ours [1]). 
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5 Estimation results 
We define the likelihood as the probability of the 501 (complete) durations 
and rilling channels according to the competing risk model. 5 Thus, the 
likelihood C is given by C — CeC0, where 
^ = II/eIl(l-^) (8) 
peo oth 
and 
^ I F o l K 1 - ^ ) ' O) 
oth peo 
because Te and T0 are independent. Ylpeo denotes the product over all va-
cancies that are filled by the public employment office; Yloth denotes the 
product over the other cases. Estimates of /?e, j e , n\, [£, v\, uj, i^e and (e 
can be obtained by maximizing £ e , and estimates of /?0, 70, /zj, fj%, ui, u%, 
ip0 en e by maximizing C0. Therefore, estimation can be done separately 
for the public employment office and other channels. 
Using the software package Gauss we obtained maximum likelihood es-
timates of the model in section 3. Table 1 gives estimates of a competing 
risk and a single risk model without unmeasured heterogeneity. Clearly, 
competing risks are a valuable expansion of the single risk model, so we can 
restrict ourselves to discussing the competing risk estimates. 6 As expected 
the employment office dummies have no effect on latent durations at other 
channels. Furthermore, mediation methods only have a significant effect on 
the selection period at the public employment office. As this invalidates the 
argument that employment offices select vacancies that are generally easy 
to fill for intensive mediation, this is very likely to be explained as the effect 
of intensive mediation. Omitting some variables with insignificant parame-
ters gives table 2. Adding unobserved heterogeneity gives no insignificant 
improvement in the determination of the latent durations at the public em-
ployment office and other channels (likelihood ratio statistics equal 5.2 and 
2.0, respectively). Note that A and 9 can succesfully be identified on the 
application and selection periods: the first is much shorter than the second, 
as will be shown later (see Abbring and Van Ours [1]). The remainder of 
sSee for example Lancaster [4], section 5.5. 
6The likelihood ratio statistic indicating the significance of the improvement of the 
model equals - 2 (440.2 + 259.2 - 576.2 - 501 log (2)) = 55.2, and is distributed \lo (see 
Narendranathan and Stewart [5]). 
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this section concerns the results in table 2. 
As was to be expected, a high number of unemployed per vacancy con-
siderably reduces the length of the application period at both the public 
employment office and other channels. The length of the selection period is 
relatively large for jobs in the metal and construction branches as well as for 
jobs in the medium and higher services branches. Employers' dissatisfaction 
with employment offices clearly favours other channels. Understandably, se-
lection periods for temporary jobs are shorter than those for steady jobs. 
Intensive mediation seems to reduce the duration of selection periods at the 
employment office. Only administrative matching has a significant effect (on 
a 10% level). 
We wiïï now further investigate the effect of the state of the labour 
market and the use of mediation methods on the total vacancy duration and 
the probability that a notified vacancy is filled by the public employment 
office. As we did not find unmeasured heterogeneity, independence of Te 
and T0 implies that the density of the total vacancy duration is given by 
/ r = / r e (1 — FT0) + fT0 (1 — -^Te)- 7 Thus, total expected vacancy duration, 
E[T], is given by 
E[T) = / tfT(t)dt = Jo 
9e90 Ao0e 
{6
 e — Xe)(0o — A0) 
Ae0o 
+ 
AeA0 
Ae + A0 Ae + 9 o A0 + 6e 0e + 90_ 
(10) 
The probability tha t a vacancy is filled by the public employment office, 
Pr{Te < T0), is, again because of independence of Te and T0 , given by 
/•oo 
Pr(Te<T0) = / / T e ( t ) ( l - f ! r 0 ( t ) )d t Jo 
Aeöe 
(9e — Ae) (90 — A0) 
90 A0 9n 
+ 
A0 
.Ae + A0 Ae + 90 A0 + 9e 9e -f 90 (11) 
Proceeding in this manner we find an expected vacancy duration of 4.3 
weeks in the sample mean. At the employment office the expected (la-
tent) application process takes 0.4 weeks and the expected (latent) selection 
process 5.8 weeks. At the other channels these processes take slightly longer, 
7We now introducé channel subscripts again. 
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that is 1.8 and 8.5 weeks, respectively. This can be explained by the f act 
that this analysis concerns vacancies that are notified at the public employ-
ment office. Vacancies that can easily be filled using other channels, like 
informal contacts, will less often be notified at the employment office. The 
probability that a notified vacancy is filled by the employment office is 67% 
in the data mean. 
Table 3 Expected vacancy durations (weeks) and the probability that 
a vacancy is filled by the public employment office8 
situation E[Ae) E[Se] E[A0] E[S0] E[T] Pr(re<r0) 
data mean 0.41 5.80 1.81 8.50 4.28 0.67 
l n ( U / V ) 
2.00 0.81 5.80 2.41 8.50 4.68 0.67 
2.50 0.55 5.80 2.05 8.50 4.43 0.67 
3.00 0.37 5.80 1.74 8.50 4.24 0.67 
3.50 0.25 5.80 1.48 8.50 4.09 0.66 
med. method 
self selection 0.41 8.21 1.81 8.50 5.14 0.58 
administrative 0.41 5.21 1.81 8.50 4.02 0.69 
selective 0.41 5.61 1.81 8.50 4.20 0.68 
Table 3 gives the expected lengths of the application and selection pe-
riods, the expected vacancy durations, and the probability that a notified 
vacancy is filled by the public employment office for selected unemployment-
vacancies ratios and the three mediation methods. Again, we notice that a 
relatively high number of unemployed reduces the length of the application 
periods to a minimum. The effect of more intensive mediation on latent 
selection durations of vacancies at the employment office is clear. Both 
administrative and selective mediation shorten the selection period. The 
probability of the employment office filling a vacancy is lifted from 58% 
when applying self selection upto 69%(68%) when applying administrative 
(selective) mediation. Additionally, the expected vacancy duration is re-
duced from 5.1 weeks when applying selfselection downto 4.0(4.2) weeks 
when applying administrative (selective) mediation. 
8In the data mean ln(U/V) equals 2.88. 
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6 Conclusions 
We have separated empirically application and selection durations in a com-
peting risk model. Application periods are relatively short, especially when 
the number of unemployed per vacancy is large. This supports the non-
sequential search assumption. More intensive mediation seems to shorten 
selection periods at the employent office, but this could partly be due to a 
sample selectivity bias. This bias exists when employment offices select va-
cancies for intensive mediation in which they have a comparative advantage 
over other search channels. Since this does not seem to be a very sensible 
action, we think that our results show that public employment offices are 
able to increase efficiency by offering more intensive matching services. 
Clearly, more information on the mediation process is needed to get 
unambiguous measures of the performance of intensive mediation methods. 
Furthermore, the manner in which the duration dependence is specified may 
be somewhat to restrictive. A more flexible specification, like in Van Ours [6] 
might sharpen our conclusions. These considerations indicate that the pre-
sented results are not yet fully satisfying. They also suggest, however, that 
improvements are possible, which could lead to more valuable results. We 
think that the framework set up in this paper is flexible enough to support 
this, although we need more information to be succesful in doing so. 
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Definition of variables 
• Vacancy duration: time period between the notification and the filling 
of a job vacancy 
• Employment offices A-D: dummies 
• Occupation (Occupational code of the public employment offices 
(ARBI-code)): metal: ARBI-code 3; construction: ARBI-code 5; ser-
vices: ARBI-code 10, 12, 13; others: ARBI-code 4, 6-9, 11, 14-17, 99 
• Education 
Secondary/higher: Secondary level, higher academie or vocational 
schooling 
• Size of the firm 
size 10-50 employees; size 50-100 employees; size >100 employees; ref-
erence group: size 0-10 employees 
• Temporary job; reference group: steady job 
• Parttime job: less than or equal to 20 hours per week; reference group: 
more than 20 hours per week 
• Employer's dissatisfaction: if the employer indicates the use of other 
recruitment channels; reference group: if the employer indicates that 
he only uses the public employment office as recruitment channel 
• Mediation method 
Administrative matching: if the vacancy information is matched with 
information about registered job seekers 
Selective matching: if, additional to administrative matching job seek-
ers are screened with respect to ability, working experience, motiva-
tion, et cetera 
Reference group: selfselection 
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B Means of variables used in the analysis by fill-
ing channel 
empl. other total 
administrative matching 
selective matching 
metal/construction 
service-second/high 
10-50 employees 
50-100 employees 
more than 100 employees 
other recruitment channel 
temporary job 
parttime job 
U/V 
vacancy duration (weeks) 
0.57 0.51 0.54 
0.28 0.26 0.27 
0.33 0.27 0.32 
0.23 0.28 0.25 
0.33 0.33 0.33 
0.11 0.11 0.11 
0.17 0.11 0.15 
0.11 0.27 0.17 
0.47 0.40 0.45 
0.29 0.32 0.30 
24.0 22.3 23.4 
4.00 5.29 4.43 
total mimber 322 179 501 
Table 1 Estimates of A and 6 without unmeasured heterogeneity9 
Ae A0 A 
hi(U/V) 0.61 (2.0) ** 0.19 (0.9) 0.49 (1.9) * 
empl. dissatisfaction -1.21 (1.2) 0.15 (0.3) -0.82 (1.4) 
employment office 1 0.79 (1.1) 0.42 (0.9) 0.73 (1.5) 
employment office 2 1.37 (1.0) 0.18 (0.3) 0.87 (0.9) 
employment office 3 0.90 (0.7) 0.42 (0.7) 0.59 (0.6) 
employment office 4 3.66 (2.2) ** -0.61 (0.9) 3.08 (2.2) ** 
mediation method 
administrative -1.23 (1.4) -0.89 (1.1) -0.77 (1.1) 
selective 0.14 (0.2) 0.65 (0.7) 0.17 (0.3) 
constant 
Mi -1.37 (1.3) -1.97 (2.3) ** -1.23 (1.4) 
0e 0o 0 
metal/construction -0.22 (1.0) -0.45 (1.1) -0.31 (1.6) 
services -0.37 (1.5) -0.16 (0.4) -0.26 (1.4) 
10-50 employees -0.03 (0.1) -0.14 (0.4) -0.10 (0.6) 
50-100 employees -0.15 (0.4) -0.66 (1.0) -0.22 (0.8) 
> 100 employees 0.15 (0.5) -0.65 (1.3) -0.13 (0.6) 
empl. dissatisfaction -0.28 (0.5) 0.72 (1.1) 0.16 (0.5) 
temporary job 0.42 (2.1) ** 0.06 (0.2) 0.31 (1.9) * 
part time job -0.23 (1.0) 0.33 (0.8) -0.12 (0.7) 
mediation method 
administrative 0.66 (2.4) ** 1.08 (1.1) 0.33 (1.5) 
selective 0.43 (1.6) -0.18 (0.3) 0.30 (1.4) 
constant 
V\ -2.08 (7.2) ** -1.71 (2.8) ** -1.40 (6.2) ** 
loglikelihood -440.2 t 259.2 -576.2 
9
 Absolute values of t-statistic in parentheses; **: significant on a 5%-level; *: significant 
on a 10%-level. A and 8 are estimates of a single risk reference model. 
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Table 2 Estimates of A and 6 
without unmeasured heterogeneity 
Ae A0 
la(U/V) 
empl. dissatisfaction 
employment office 1 
employment office 2 
employment office 3 
employment office 4 
constant 
m 
0.78 (2.5) ** 0.33 (0.9) 
-1.35 (1.4) 0.25 (0.3) 
1.02 (1.4) 
0.87 (0.6) 
1.68 (1.5) 
3.12 (1.8) * 
-2.47 (3.7) ** -1.58 (1.5) 
0e @o 
metal/construction 
services 
10-50 employees 
50-100 employees 
> 100 employees 
empl. dissatisfaction 
temporary job 
part time job 
mediation method 
administrative 
selective 
constant 
-0.17 (0.8) -0.41 (1.2) 
-0.34 (1.5) -0.06 (0.2) 
0.01 (0.0) -0.24 (0.9) 
-0.17 (0.5) -0.63 (1.5) 
0.14 (0.5) -0.61 (1.5) 
-0.29 (0.6) 0.40 (1.0) 
0.40 (2.1) ** 0.17 (0.7) 
-0.21 (1.0) -0.06 (0.2) 
0.45 (1.9) * 
0.38 (1.5) 
-2.04 (7.2) ** -1.88 (5.3) ** 
loglikelihood -441.3 -263.6 
with unmeasured heterogeneity 
A e s t / e A0,C70 
loglikelihood -438.7 -262.6 
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